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1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
JONES' FOCUS ON UTAH PROBATE LAW ERRONEOUSLY
IGNORES AND FAILS TO REFUTE THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT
While Appellee Robert Lee Jones (hereinafter Jones) correctly
states that Utah statues take precedence over Utah common law, the
Utah Probate Code does not contain any section dealing with
conflicts of laws issues between states. Nor is there extant any
codification of conflict of laws which therefore remains controlled
by common law.
The "Conflict of laws" in the present case arises because the
former

Utah

statute

regarding

pretermitted

children, differs

greatly from the corresponding California statute.

Former Utah

Code Ann. §75-2-302(1)(a) provided as follows:
(1) If a testator fails to provide in his will for any of
his children or issue of a deceased child, the omitted child
or issue receives a share in the estate equal in value to that
which he would have received if the testator had died
intestate unless:
(a) It appears from the will that the omission was
intentional.
Unlike the old Utah Provision, Calif. Code § 6570 restricts
the finding of a pretermitted child to children born or adopted
after execution of the subject will:
Except as provided in Section 6671, if a testator fails
to provide in his or her will for a child of the testator born
or adopted after the execution of the will, the omitted child
shall receive a share in the estate equal in value to that
which the child would have received if the testator had died
intestate. (Emphasis added)
1

Utah Code Ann. §75-2-302 dealing with pretermitted children
has been amended to agree with the corresponding California
provision.

Appellant Personal Representative Linda Anglesey (hereinafter
Anglesey) has presented an impressive amount of case law, from the
United States Supreme Court on down, holding specifically that
where real property is owned by a deceased in a state other than
their domicile, it is the law of the situs state which controls the
disposition of said property.

See additionally Matter of Estate of

Reed, 664 P.2d 824, 831 (Kan. 1983); In Re Estate of Swanson, 397
So.2d 465, 466 (Fla. App. 1981); West v. White, 758 P.2d 424, 426
(Or. App. 1988). In fact where a "will devises land in more than
one state, the courts in each state will construe it as to the
lands located therein as if devised by separate wills".

Swanson

Supra (quoting Trotter v. VanPelt, 144 Fla. 517, 522, 198 So. 215,
217,

(1940)).
Jones, on the other hand, has presented the court with no case

law, nor statute for that matter, to the contrary.

Jones' only

attempt to deal with the unanimity of the courts' decisions on this
issue is the misinterpretation of one case cited by Anglesey and
brief references to case law and a Restatement section which are
not relevant to said issue.
Jones' conclusion that In re Rays Estate, 287 P.2d 692 (Wyo.
1955), cited by Anglesey in her Appellant's Brief, "implicitly
recognized

the

Nevada

court's

finding

that

the

son

was

a

pretermitted child", is completely erroneous. In fact, the Wyoming
court found that the question of whether the son was pretermitted
was irrelevant under Wyoming law which provides that "a testator is
free to bestow his bounty upon those whom he wishes," and refused
2

to "engraft on the law of the (State of Wyoming) a statutory
provision of another, which we do not have." Jd. at 635.
The case of Estate of Duauesne, 29 Utah 2d 94, 505 P.2d 779
(1973) cited by Jones deals with a completely different set of
facts and issues than the case at bar.

This Court, in Duquesne,

applied the same body of conflicts of law, common law, which Jones
earlier denounced, in finding that the issue of the legitimacy of
a child is a question of "status" and not "situs" and is therefore
determined by the laws of the domicile state.

Id., at 781.

Although this Court goes on to say that such is the law in an
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, at no point is the issue in
the case at bar discussed.
The case of Andre v. Morrow, 680 P.2d 1355 (Idaho 1984) cited
by Jones goes even further into the realm of irrelevancy.

While

Andre, a fraud case, does affirm the rule that "the courts of one
state cannot directly affect title to realty located in another
state," Id. at 1365, there are no conflicts of laws issues
discussed, nor issues involving pretermitted children or ancillary
probate proceedings.

The case is simply inapplicable.

The obscure comment to the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
of Law, §236 also cited by Jones is, again, unpersuasive. First of
all, Jones can point to no case law or jurisdiction which has
followed such a position and secondly, such a coercive use of
judicial power by way of personal jurisdiction over parties was
exactly the situation warned against in Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S.
186, 20 S.Ct. 873, 44 L.Ed 1028 (1900) and its long progeny as
3

discussed in Anglesey's Appellant's Brief.

It is significant to

note at this point as well that Jones failed or refused to even
address the Clarke case and its holding. Moreover, said comment to
the

Restatement

requires

that

the

deceased

and

all

heirs

be

domiciled in the same state, which is not the case in the matter
before the Court.
POINT II
IT IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR JONES TO ARGUE
QUESTIONS OF FACT OR THE PROPRIETY OF THE
CALIFORNIA RULING IN THIS PROCEEDING
A. The Utah Court of Appeals Did Not Rule That "The Testator
Did Not Intend to Omit His Son."
Jones' Statement of Facts makes the representation that the
holding

in the prior appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals

(Estate

of

Herbert

Lee

Jones v. Jones, 459 P.2d

345

(1988))

included a finding that the Testator did not intend to omit his
son, Robert Lee Jones, from his will.
last paragraph).
misleading.

Said

(Appellee's Brief, pg. 10,

statement, however, is both

false

and

While it is true that the Appeals Court did hold that

Jones was a pretermitted child, said holding was based exclusively
on former Utah Code Ann §75-2-302(1) which prohibited the trial
court from looking at extrinsic evidence to determine whether a
child was intentionally omitted from a will. Id. at 349.

Such

distinction is important because the California court could not
have relied on the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in any
event, as suggested by Jones, and was required to hold its own
trial to determine that Jones was intentionally omitted from his

4

father's will.
B. The California Court Decision Was Based Upon California
Law and the California Court's Findings at Trial
Beside the fact that it is presumptuous of Jones to speculate
on the decision making process used by the California court, it is
clear from the record available that the Judge was unwilling to
base his decision on Utah law or a prior Utah court decision. For
this reason the Judge required the presentation of evidence
regarding the omission of Jones from his father's will and based
his decision on said evidence and California law. (R. at 530-538)
Had Jones bothered to appear or object during said ancillary
proceeding, it is obvious that he would have had an opportunity to
present evidence on his own behalf. As Jones elected not to appear
in said proceeding, he is estopped from now complaining about how
it was conducted and speculate on the basis of the Court's
decision.
C. Jones May Not Argue Disputed Facts Where the Trial Court
Ruled as a Matter of Law.
The trial court herein ruled as a matter of law, after hearing
only, that the California court decision was "wholly invalid". (R.
at 550-552), Jones now wishes to argue that the decision of the
California Court was procured by fraud on the part of Anglesey.
First of all, such is not the case and was disputed vehemently by
Anglesey at hearing.

(R. at 480-485).

Secondly, any question of

fraud must be resolved in the appropriate forum, before the
California court.

Third, the California court was not interested

in the Utah proceedings or Utah Law, and finally all facts disputed
5

at hearing must be considered in the light most favorable to the
Appellant Anglesey.

Moreover, as pointed out above, Jones has

forfeited any right to dispute the California court decision and is
estopped therefrom. Jones7 attempt to argue said facts, therefore,
is inappropriate.
D. Anglesey is Not Estopped From Denvincr That Jones is a
Pretermitted Heir in California.
Jones' contention that because the issue of California law was
not raised in the initial trial before the Utah Third District
court, Anglesey is estopped from raising it in the California
Ancillary

proceeding

is circular

logic

at

its worst.

The

California law and real property issues were not litigated in Utah
because Utah has no subject matter

jurisdiction with regard

thereto, and all parties were aware that an ancillary proceeding
would be required to determine the disposition of California real
property.
Moreover, Anglesey's position throughout all proceedings has
been completely consistent.

She has always contended that Jones

was intentionally disinherited, to which all triers of fact have
agreed.

And, once again, any such estoppel argument should have

been made by Jones in the California proceeding and is irrelevant
and inappropriate at this point.
POINT III
JUDICIAL ECONOMY WILL NOT BE EFFECTED
BY THE COURT'S DECISION HEREIN
Despite

Jones' use

of

cliche's

like

"overcrowded

court

calendars" and "flood of proceedings", the law as set forth by
6

Anglesey is the current law in every jurisdiction which has decided
this

issue.

It is already

necessary

to

file an ancillary

proceeding in every state a deceased owned real property and each
state is allowed to scrutinize the subject will and award real
property in accordance with its own laws. There will be no change
or floodgate of litigation.
The only policy question before the Court in fact, is whether
Utah is willing to unilaterally throw away a good part of its
sovereignty and the ability to control the disposition of real
property located in this state.

CONCLUSION
Jones' attempt to rely on the provisions of the Utah Probate
Code ignores the fact that said statutes are oft times in conflict
with similar provisions in other states.

It is the resolution of

said conflict of laws that is the issue before the Court and which
has been unanimously decided by all courts since the United States
Supreme Court in 1900.

The disposition of real property in a

probate proceeding is determined by the laws of the situs state and
not the deceased's domicile.
Jones' further attempts to question the validity of the
California court ruling regarding California real property are
unsupported, untimely and inappropriate in this forum.

Moreover,

the Court should find in favor of Anglesey on policy reasons as
well, to avoid the loss of Utah state sovereignty.

7

WHEREFORE, Anglesey prays for relief as set forth in her
Appellant's Brief.
Dated this

,/(

day of September, 1992.
BROWN, LARSON, JENKINS & HALLIDAY
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